

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 264999

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NZ, UN

SUBJECT: CTB

1. NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY OFFICERS (RYAN AND LARKINDALE) VISITED ACDA OFFICER (NEIDLE) ON NOVEMBER 4 TO DISCUSS STATUS OF CTB NEGOTIATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF BREZHNEV PROPOSALS. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED SITUATION IN NEW YORK AT UN AND ACDA OFFICIAL SUGGESTED POSSIBLE APPROACH FOR SEEKING BROAD CONSENSUS RESOLUTION WHICH US, USSR AND UK COULD SUPPORT AS WELL AS NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES.

2. ACDA OFFICER SAID THAT OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT WAS THAT
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NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS CONSTITUTED IMPORTANT MOVE WHICH COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS POSSIBLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO AGREE TO STOP EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES (PNES). NOW THEY WERE AT LEAST WILLING TO STOP THEM FOR THREE YEARS. THAT WAS CLEARLY A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN APPROACH. ALSO, SOVIETS PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO HAVE A TREATY ENTER INTO FORCE WITHOUT

ADHERENCE BY CHINA AND FRANCE. NOW THEY SAID A TREATY COULD AT LEAST BE EFFECTIVE FOR THREE YEARS WITHOUT REQUIRING ADHERENCE OF THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. OBVIOUSLY NO TREATY HAD BEEN IN SIGHT UNDER THE EARLIER SOVIET POSITION.

3. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL RELATED TO

DURATION. IT WOULDN'T BE A VERY GOOD RESULT TO HAVE THE TREATY AUTOMATICALLY COLLAPSE IN THREE YEARS. THIS WOULD BE A VERY UNSTABLE SITUATION. EVERYONE WOULD BE PLANNING THE RESUMPTION OF THEIR TESTING. AND THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE THREE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON PNES WHICH WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A TREATY PROTOCOL. THAT ALSO SHOULD NOT COLLAPSE AUTOMATICALLY IN THREE YEARS. BUT EVEN THOUGH THESE WERE MAJOR PROBLEMS, THERE WAS AT LEAST NOW A PROSPECT OF SEEKING ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

4. NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY OFFICIAL ASKED WHETHER VERIFICATION WOULD BE AN OBSTACLE. ACDA OFFICER RESPONDED THAT MANY POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION WERE UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION, E.G., THE MANNER OF LAUNCHING ON-SITE INVESTIGATIONS, PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS, INTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS WITH PROVISION FOR AUTHENTICATED DATA, AUTOMATIC SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA. THESE WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER AND WE WERE HOPEFUL THAT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AS A WHOLE COULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

5. ACDA OFFICER THEN TURNED CONVERSATION TO SITUATION IN NEW YORK IN DEVELOPING A RESOLUTION ON CTB. HE SUGGESTED THAT NEW PROSPECTS FOR REAL PROGRESS IN CTB NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE RELEVANT AND SHOULD HAVE EFFECT ON WAY IN WHICH UNGA RESOLUTION IS WORKED OUT. IN PAST YEARS MANY COUNTRIES FELT THEY WERE ENGAGED IN FAIRLY ACADEMIC EXERCISE. A CTB WAS NOT REALLY EXPECTED AND THEREFORE IT DID NOT SEEM TO MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE WHETHER NUCLEAR TESTING POWERS SUPPORTED THE CTB RES. AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF RES, IN VIEW OF MANY, WERE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE MUCH IMPACT IN ANY EVENT.

6. NOW, HOWEVER, ACDA OFFICER CONTINUED, SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT. WE BELIEVE WE ARE REALLY HEADING FOR A CTB. MAIN TASK NOW THEREFORE OUGHT TO BE TO BEGIN BUILDING WIDEST POSSIBLE WORLDWIDE CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF EFFECTIVE AND REALISTIC CTB. NEW ZEALAND, AS COUNTRY PLAYING MOST ACTIVE ROLE IN DEVELOPING RES, HAD GENUINE OPPORTUNITY OF LEADERSHIP TO TRY TO WORK TOWARD CONSENSUS RESOLUTION. IF THIS EFFORT WERE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD BEGIN

PROCESS OF BUILDING CONSENSUS BEHIND CTB ITSELF. ACDA OFFICER SAID HE HAD JUST LEARNED THAT SOVIETS IN NEW YORK WERE SUGGESTING FAIRLY MODERATE CHANGES IN NEW ZEALAND DRAFT RES. WE HAD ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CAST A SOMEWHAT BENIGN ABSTENTION, BUT IF TYPE OF CHANGES NOW BEING DISCUSSED COULD BE WORKED OUT, PERHAPS IT WAS EVEN POSSIBLE FOR US AND USSR TO SUPPORT RES, AS WELL AS MOST OF THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THIS

WOULD BE WORTHWHILE ACHIEVEMENT.

7. ACDA OFFICER STRESSED THAT IT WAS NEITHER DESIRABLE NOR APPROPRIATE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE PROVISIONS HERE IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, THERE WERE SEVERAL GENERAL POINTS
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WHICH IT WOULD CLEARLY BE HELPFUL IF NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK COULD TAKE A FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS.

--A. NEW ZEALAND DRAFT REFERRED TO PREVIOUS CONDEMNATIONS OF TESTING BY ASSEMBLY. THIS OPERATIVE PARA WAS REALLY LARGELY ATMOSPHERIC, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE. IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE TO MODIFY THE LANGUAGE SOMEWHAT SO THAT WE AND SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO JOIN IN REFERRING TO A CONDEMNATION OF OUR OWN ACTIONS WHICH WE DID NOT FEEL WERE IMPROPER IN THE ABSENCE OF A CTB.

--B. SEVERAL PARAS SET FORTH QUITE UNREALISTIC DEADLINES OR TARGET DATES. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONCLUDE OUR TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF 1977. ALSO, THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH WOULD BEGIN IN MAY 1978, OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT "ADOPT" A COMPLETED TREATY SINCE IT WAS ANTICIPATED THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION OF VARIOUS PARTS OF THE TREATY. NOW THAT WE WERE REALLY MOVING TOWARDS A TREATY, WHAT WAS THE SENSE IN SETTING IMPOSSIBLE TARGET DATES?

--C. FINALLY, ACDA OFFICER CALLED ATTENTION TO OPERATIVE PARA WHICH STATED OBJECTIVE OF "COMPLETE CESSATION OF ALL NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS". HE SAID THIS WAS EXCELLENT STATEMENT AND NEW ZEALANDERS SHOULD BE VERY FIRM IN RESISTING ANY PRESSURES TO LIMIT THIS OBJECTIVE TO JUST STOPPING "ALL WEAPON TESTS".

8. NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY OFFICIALS THOUGHT THESE WERE REASONABLE POINTS. THEY BELIEVED WELLINGTON MIGHT BE QUITE ATTRACTED TO POSSIBILITY THAT NEW ZEALAND MIGHT
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TRY TO LEAD THE WAY TOWARD GENUINE CONSENSUS RESULT. ACDA OFFICER REPEATED THAT IDEA WAS TO STRENGTHEN HAND OF NEW ZEALAND UN NEGOTIATORS IN GIVING THEM REQUISITE FLEXIBILITY TO ACHIEVE LARGER OBJECTIVE. HE CAUTIONED THAT USG HAD NATURALLY NOT TAKEN ANY DECISIONS ON HOW WE WOULD VOTE ON RESOLUTIONS. HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED US WOULD PREFER IF A POSITIVE CONSENSUS RESULT COULD BE ACHIEVED WHICH ALL COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN CTB COULD SUPPORT. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT IF THERE WERE REAL PROSPECTS FOR THIS RESULT, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO OUR BEST WITH THE SOVIETS

TO INFLUENCE THEM IN THE SAME DIRECTION. NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY OFFICERS SAID THEY WOULD REPORT FULLY. CHRISTOPHER

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